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The Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Council

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NOTE FOR: Charley Waterman
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SUBJECT: Policy Planning Discussion Topics

I propose the following as substitute formulations of your nuclear proliferation topics:

- What difference, if any, does the global non-proliferation regime (the NPT, the IAEA and its safeguards systems, nuclear supplier guidelines) make in impeding or deterring acquisition of nuclear weapons? (US views these as crucial.)
- How powerfully do disincentives to nuclear weapons acquisition (e.g., technical difficulties, ideological inhibitions, reactions of neighbors and superpowers, vulnerability to pre-emption) act to retard the proliferation process? (US assumptions are that they are relatively weak.)
- Where do US and Soviet non-proliferation interests coincide? Where do they diverge? Can the Soviets and the US act together in ways that will make a difference to proliferation trends and outcomes? Would a mutual cessation of nuclear testing matter? (A popular US view is that a CTBT would carry substantial non-proliferation benefits.)

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